The Sunday Mail
Major-General Trust Mugoba
The African Standby Force is one of the pillars of the African Union peace and security architecture. That architecture is established through the AU’s constitutive Act which set out to also establish the Peace and Security Council to superintend peace and security in Africa.
The AUPSC is constituted by Heads of State from the five African regions rotationally.
Below that is the Commissioner for Peace and Security responsible for day-to-day peace and security issues on the continent.
The idea of the African Standby Force was first deliberated on in Harare in 1997 on the occasion of the African Defence and Security Chiefs’ meeting, chaired by General Vitalis Zvinavashe.
Then, I was privileged to be an AU expert on peace and security.
The 1997 architecture was an improvement to the Organisation for African Unity’s original idea of having an African High Command – a force that would constitute all armies in Africa.
It was easier to manage regional economic groupings and establish standby brigades/forces.
The Sadc Standby Brigade came into fruition, later becoming the Sadc Standby Force in 2007
Initially, the idea was to form brigades, which was purely a military component.
It was then realised that there was need to include police and civilian elements to bring in the multi-dimensional phenomenon common in peace support operations.
Jacob Zuma
So, as we speak, (the Force) has the capabilities to perform a multi-dimensional peace support operation; the military capability to intervene and neutralise any situation.
We have a policing element and civilian component (humanitarian activities).
The Force’s activities are political, governed by a political establishment: the AUPSC and Summit.
From 1997, subsequent phases entailed drawing a roadmap leading to its operationalisation.
Various scenarios were created for its development, with regional economic groupings developing their capabilities.
Now, we have Sadc, the East African Brigade, Ecowas and the East and Central African Brigade.
The North African Community comprises mainly staff components, the reason being the disturbances that occurred in North Africa.
It is not fully constituted, though they participate actively in the African Standby Force.
Having developed that, the final scenario was to test the capabilities of the African Standby Force: whether it could be mandated, deployed and operationalised.
So, Scenario Six was created.
This is an AU doctrine, which implies that the African Standby Force must be able to deploy fighting capabilities – an intervention force.
That intervention force, headed by a force commander, then moves into a conflict area, neutralises the situation and transitions to a peace support operation where you bring in the AU Commission Chair’s special representative and head of mission, and the police and civilian elements to Scenario Five.
Scenario Five is a multi-dimensional peace support operation.
One critical component of this Force is that in terms of policy, the constitutive Act moved a step from Africa’s agreement of non-interfere with the internal affairs of any nation by virtue of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Major-General Trust Mugoba
They learnt from the genocide in Rwanda where AU inaction and withdrawal by the United Nations Peace Force resulted in genocide.
Everyone was looking. So the constitutive Act was then established.
It was agreed that “we cannot be indifferent to a situation that develops”.
Therefore, the African Standby Force, through the constitutive Act, allows the AU to intervene in a State where there is genocide, humanitarian crisis, particularly where there is death of nationals.
It pacifies the situation and then transitions to a multi-dimensional peace support operation, finally handing over that operation to the UN because the ultimate responsibility for peace and security resides with the global body.
That gives the background to Amani Africa 2 Field Training Exercise which was conducted in South Africa in October-November 2015.
The broad objective was to validate the capacity of the AU to mandate, deploy and employ a Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force as a start-up operation, running and transitioning it into multi-dimensional peace support.
The exercise – with that broad objective – also had specific objectives.
The first was to engage the African Union Peace and Security Council to mandate the Rapid Deployment Capability.
Certain processes precede this deployment: early warning, engaging the Panel of the Wise and an Assessment Mission evaluating the developing situation.
Recommendations are then brought to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security who, in turn, submits them to the PSC stating that a particular situation needs deployment.
The AUPSC has to mandate the Rapid Deployment Capability.
So, Amani Africa II sought to test that capability.
Secondly, it was to practise deployment and employment of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force.
This means deploying a force in the design of Rapid Deployment Capability, which would then be able to do that and sustain it in the operational area, and to manage the transition from intervention to multi-dimensional peace support.
Thirdly, managing the mission – the intervention force/Rapid Deployment Capability and multi-dimensional peace support operation – and then enhancing and practising the police and civilian capacities of the African Standby Force to ensure they plan and conduct a peace support operation as mandated by the AU.
That was the broad objective along with the specifics. The total figure of military personnel was 5 400 men and women.
A scenario was created. There was an island called Karana.
This was the “country” that had a problem; therefore, the mandate was to deploy an African Mission to Karana.
The military element was divided into two.
Rapid Deployment Capability 1 comprised countries like Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe – a total of 1 500 equipped troops.
Then we had Rapid Deployment Capability 2, which comprised South Africa, Rwanda, Niger and Uganda, with a total of about 2 000 troops.
A component of about 1 500 was introduced for their sustenance: Logistics, which, in military terms, we call Real Life Support.
South Africa was the host country.
As such, that component was dominated by the South African National Defence Force. The police, civilian and military (elements) totalled 5 400.
Of these, 794 were female soldiers, a far cry from the 50 percent (quota).
We also had Rapid Deployment Capability 3, which comprised the regional economic groupings.
This component would reinforce the military component in Phase Two, which is the multi-dimensional peace support operation constituted from Ecas and Ecowas.
Angola also doubles up in that region and we had Kenya and Nigeria in that third component.
So, that was the structure of the forces.
The exercise was divided into four stages. The first was force mobilisation (October 4 to 25, 2015).
Phase 1 (October 4 to 14) was for Rapid Deployment Capability.
October 25 was when the regional economic groupings’ forces came into play, beginning the operation with everyone else.
The intervention period was October 25 to 30, and then the multi-dimensional peace support operation ran from October 31 to November 3.
Demobilisation was from November 9 to 14.
In terms of the military’s role, capacity evaluation and Rapid Deployment Capability, the forces from all the countries I have mentioned were able to deploy within the stipulated period (October 4 to 14), reflecting that that capability of rapid deployment was achievable.
There was also air movement, an aspect that kicked in somewhat by default.
Part of the Rapid Deployment Capability was to be done by the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, both partners of the AU.
But at the last minute, they could not provide resources to bring the forces.
Consequently, the AU requested Angola, Nigeria and Algeria to provide that air capability; which they did.
It was a blessing in disguise.
We tested our capacity to move by road and by air.
It means the capability of African states to move their troops is there. What is required is to harmonise those capabilities so that we don’t quickly rush to ask for a capability that we have; inherent in our own states.
Another aspect was deployment validation. Were we able to deploy the appropriate resources with capability to neutralise the situation?
We had three battle groups.
When you talk of a battle group, you are talking of a configuration of artillery, air defence components, armour and ground and motorised forces.
That capability is enough to neutralise (the enemy).
We had naval capability to support ground forces, and air capability of jets on call.
And as part of the Force Commander’s Forces, we had helicopter capability for reconnaissance and fire power.
So, in terms of capability to neutralise an enemy, we had it, and we were able to demonstrate that capability during Demonstration Day.
We used all assets at disposal.
The validation, therefore, says, “We can deploy and sustain!”
In terms of doctrine, when you deploy an intervention force, the Force Commander is also the head of mission.
Yes, that was the scenario, but what needs to be done is to make the AU policy mechanism very clear. The mandate must define that one is the Force Commander and the responsibilities.
The transition from intervention to multi-dimensional peace support was done in two days – October 30 to 31 – with deployment of the multi-dimensional force running from November 1 to 3.
That transition entails a ceremony, with the Force Commander surrendering authority.
In real life situations, the AU flag moves from the force headquarters to the mission headquarters.
When the mission HQ is established, a special representative of the AU Commission Chair, a deputy SRCC, a chief of staff who is a civilian, head of mission support, the Force Commander and Police Commissioner constitute the senior mission leadership.
So, we transformed and transitioned into the multi-dimensional peace support operation.
We changed Rapid Deployment Capability 1, 2 and 3 to African Standby Force 1, 2 and 3 to reflect that we were more amenable; we now had someone prepared to speak to the civilian establishment.
The dominant element is humanitarian management; peace negotiations.
The military component does the patrols, dealing with disarmament and overall security.
When His Excellency, President Jacob Zuma (South Africa), addressed the dignitaries, he asserted that the African Standby Force was operational.
What is required is a formal report that will be submitted first to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security who will, subsequently, take it up with defence chiefs who will then deliberate on it and, in turn, supported by the Commissioner of Peace and Security, make submissions to the AUPSC.
The AUPSC will – at some point of the AU processes and deliberations – formalise the matter with Summit, operationalising it.
What is critical is the AU was able to test the capability of mandating, deploying and sustaining the African Standby Force and transitioning it to multi-dimensional peace support.
Total Buy-in
The first issue was dealing with the policy framework. It takes long. Like I said, in 1997, we still had the OAU and we had the idea of the African High Command.
And then we had this new dimension – the African Standby Force – based on regional economic groupings.
To get everyone to understand the concept took some time.
Secondly, the legal instrument was not there. This is why in 2002, when the constitutive Act established the AU, the AUPSC architecture was then established, and it is this council that identifies the African Standby Force as a critical component of this architecture.
Now, to then align the systems and policy direction on how it is managed and operated. So, there was an alignment of policy and an alignment of the force structures.
The AU started off with the African Standby Brigade, which was military.
Remember, Nigeria had deployed Ecomog, the military component of Ecowas, during conflicts in West Africa. And so regional economic groupings had to set up their own instruments.
In Sadc, we had the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation mandated to manage peace and security in the region.
Therefore, it had to align with this new animal called the Sadc Standby Force.
Similarly, all the other regions had to do that.
When the regions declared that their standby forces were ready, it then had to be linked up with the AUPSC.
This is the reason why it took long; the development stages in terms of instruments and legal elements.
Part of them are still not finalised, still being developed.
During deployment, for instance, you would find issues to do with the status of forces’ agreements, movement of forces into other countries, regions.
It was also part of testing that whole process; the legal framework included.
How do you bring weapons into the Republic of South Africa and take them back? How do you account for ammunition that you bring into the Republic of South Africa and use it, and you have no ammunition when you go back?
The processes relate to legal instruments that had to be put in place – at government, regional economic grouping and AU level.
Zimbabwe’s milestone
In terms of personnel deployed, we had 19 to 20 countries. So, the AU has, in fact, endorsed the concept.
It means what had been missing – buy-in from AU Heads of State and their governments – was in place.
I think the doubt was: Is it possible to raise the force, deploy it and be able to use it? Is this thing feasible?
That needed to be tested.
The African Standby Force’s implementation, operationalisation needed someone who would say, “Let’s get it done. Let’s test it. If doesn’t work, it doesn’t work.”
I’m happy that this exercise was conducted under the tutorship of President Mugabe, the Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, and Chairman of the African Union.
I believe that when he eventually moves out of the AU office, by then, the African Standby Force would have been operationalised.
This is a major achievement for Zimbabwe. The idea was harmonised (not necessarily developed) in Zimbabwe.
The roadmap design was done in Zimbabwe in 1997 when Zimbabwe was OAU Chair.
It is a major milestone for our nation.
This is why Zimbabwe’s Defence Minister, Dr Sydney Sekeramayi, officially launched the exercise on the AU Chair’s behalf.
It’s a major achievement for Zimbabwe.
I was very happy to have been given the responsibility to command the force in this first African Standby Force exercise.
I was asked by the AU at a review meeting: “If you were given the question, can you declare the African Standby Force operational?”
I boldly said, “Yes, I declare it operational.”
They took it for a fact as the evaluation was that it was successful.
The way forward would be filling the gaps that were identified – issues to do with logistics, communication; which was a challenge when we deployed.
The African Standby Force should have inherent communication capabilities where you can communicate with the AU – the strategic HQ – and mission, force and police HQs.
Issues to do with actual financial implications and assessing and processing the budget.
There are other administrative issues relating to movement of personnel into training areas and the legal instrument – the relationship between the AU and regional economic groupings in terms of military usage, setting up these inherent logistical capabilities for the African Standby Force.
For instance, the UN now has logistics bases throughout the world where logistical elements are placed and then taken for use.
Similarly, there is that scenario in Nato and so on.
The other gap is related to developing the necessary human resource component for the military, civilian element and police to ensure there is ready human resource capability.
The budget is a critical component of such a huge exercise.
Some of the logistical challenges and gaps were that there hadn’t been sufficient assessment of the financial implications.
The gap was then filled by the host nation, in particular the SANDF. It was a huge burden on them to sustain the exercise; which is also a lesson for us.
I think Sadc did well in this regard, contributing US$3 million towards the exercise.
We were advised that Kenya also contributed US$1 million. There were contributions from other member states. It is critical that the budget be worked out. That budget has a bearing on future deployments: A force with a particular capability requires a certain budget.
In the military, there is something we call “maintenance of momentum”.
Maintenance of momentum means enhancing capabilities and filling gaps – polishing up. That is a process, and I think it is critical that that is done. I know one of the major activities that will take place next year is what we call the “After Action Review”, which will deal with issues to do with maintenance of momentum.
But it is critical that the African Standby Force remains visible; it must continue to be talked about.
That is part of maintenance of momentum. That is the way forward, actually.
And part of maintenance of momentum is to make it operational.
The Heads of State directed that this African Standby Force be deployed and tested.
The Force is for use by the AU when there is trouble. It is an insurance policy just like the Zimbabwe Defence Forces.
ZDF are there to guarantee peace and security in Zimbabwe, and to defend territorial integrity against any external or internal aggression.
It is up to Government structures to decide when we can utilise it when a threat arises.
(In the same way) the AU is now able to say, at some point, that we have a capability that we can use, and the processes – like I mentioned earlier – of assessing the place and point at which to use it are in place, ensuring it can be utilised when required.
And those processes deal with AU policies and procedures.
The next stage (from here) is that as Force Commander, I will submit a report to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, so will the Police Commissioner and the special representative of the AU Commission Chair.
We did a wash-up after the exercise, and we are going to have a senior leadership review meeting.
Thereafter, there will be a defence chiefs’ meeting where the report on the exercise – Amani Africa – will be tabled.
The defence chiefs will then escalate it to their defence and security ministers, with the AUPSC and ultimately Summit also getting the report.
At some point, perhaps during the next AU Summit, we will hear a pronouncement on the African Standby Force.
African solutions
Culture is critical to Africans. We have commonality in our culture. Africans, generally, are not ruthless: We are humane.
Now, we have experienced the ruthlessness of foreigners in colonisation and the subsequent liberation of our countries.
We had to fight (but) the stranglehold on our resources still continues. So, when those countries intervene and provide us security, it demeans the African.
It is our responsibility; it dignifies us.
I was greatly relieved when I heard that the forces had eventually been brought in by aeroplanes from Nigeria, Algeria and Angola instead of Nato and the EU – our own resources.
Our Head of State says: “African solutions for African problems.”
At times, the issue mentioned as a challenge is inter-operability because of different languages.
But here we were; 5 400 troops and different languages. Yes, there might be need for improvement, but we were able to do it.
In most cases, part of the problem is when external forces intervene; they will still create more problems for us.
Most solutions in Sadc, for instance, have been dealt with in the context of the regional bloc’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.
It is our continent, after all.
It was for this aspect of “we are incapable of doing our own things” that the African Standby Force was formed and exercised to ensure we are capable of solving our own problems.
And because of the interactions we have, particularly at Head of State and ministerial level, at military colleges, institutions, police and as civilians, one will probably realise that it is easier to deal with problems as you will find people you know and ask them, “Why are you fighting?”
It’s easier to manage the situation within the confines of people you know than having someone who will bring in more complications.
Look at the problems we’ve had in Chad, in Mali because of the intervention of the French, for instance.
It becomes a real problem.
Where is Libya now? Back to feudal times! We have no state in Libya; that is a typical example.
There was genocide in Rwanda because it was foreign elements coming in to do the peace-keeping for us, and 800 000 people died.
But in the DRC, we had Sadc moving in and eventually there was improvement.
Look at Mozambique – relative peace. Fine, they have incidents here and there, but they are always dealt with within our own confines.
Look at Somalia; who is there?
Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and others – these are all Africans dealing with the situation there.
So, there are examples that reflect that we can do things on our own. We have the capabilities. I think what we need to do as Africans is to bring in more financial resources. After all, we pay money to the AU, the UN as part of our contribution to the peace.
We have a financial element that should always come from the responsibility of the UN to support us in maintaining peace, and they are doing that.
This is the confidence we need to give rather than going the other way.
After the exercise, the sentiment was: “This is possible, after all. We doubted our capacities.”
It is unfortunate that as Africans, we always doubt our capacities and think someone can sort out things for us.
This is why His Excellency is always talking about African solutions to African problems.
That’s it.
◆ Major-General Trust Mugoba is the Zimbabwe National Army’s Chief of Staff General Staff. He was speaking to The Sunday Mail News Editor Morris Mkwate in Harare on November 25, 2015.
