The Sunday Mail
For about seven months after crossing from Rhodesia to Botswana and finally Zambia, Cde Daylight Mabanga found himself at Nampundu Camp without military training. According to him, the commanders at the camp were sceptical of his clergy background. “They could not understand why men of cloth wanted to take the gun and kill,” says Cde Mabanga. The former freedom fighter chronicles to our Deputy News Editor Levi Mukarati (LM) how the scepticism turned to trust that saw him being part of 12 cadres selected for “special training”.
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LM: You said there was a situation between yourself and Cde Todhlana. Can you get into details?
DM: Remember I mentioned Reverend Masiyane. There was no way he could have evaded Nampundu, asi ini handina kumuona kuhondo.
Ndakatozomuona tadzoka kubva kuhondo. At Nampundu, I was still in the company of my friend Harmony.
We were the only pastors then. Cde Todhlana seemed eager to find answers why mafundisi tauya kuhondo.
He took his time to understand us.
On more than 10 occasions he called us, separately, to find out why we had come to war.
During that time there was an influx of people, including those from our home area coming to Zambia.
I think these are the people who attested that we were indeed pastors in Rhodesia and sided with the freedom fighters.
We had arrived at Nampundu in September 1975. It was only between March and April 1976 that Cde Todhlana selected a group of 12, including me, for special training at CGT Camp.
My friend Harmony was a builder by profession.
By the time we were selected, he had already been assigned to a section of people doing construction work at various locations in Zambia, including at JZ Camp.
It was a transit camp for Zipra cadres as they launched their mission into the Rhodesian front.
LM: You had no prior military training, but you ended up in a group of just 12 people. What do you mean by special training; what did CGT stand for and can you identify the colleagues making up the team?
DM: We only knew the camp as CGT. It was a transit camp along the Great East Road in Zambia.
That is where all Zipra cadres were dispatched to the front.
As for members of that group, I am sorry at this moment I cannot name them without their indulgence, except for Cde Joseph Sibuko or Chrispen Mbezi and Cde Makwakwa who is late.
Most of the members of our group are still serving in Government, mostly in the security services. We trained for six months in basic military and intelligence skills.
From the group, five of us were selected to go to Bulgaria to train in propaganda and strategic planning.
We trained for nine months in Bulgaria.
The other seven went to East Germany for training in intelligence.
We returned to Zambia Freedom Camp in 1977.
When we returned, some of my colleagues were taken to work at Zimbabwe House in Zambia as political commissars on the civilian side.
Cde Makwakwa and myself went back to CGT, meaning we were ready to come back home and launch our operations against the Rhodesian government. That was in 1977.
The longest period you could stay at CGT before going to the front was a month.
In most cases, trained comrades would arrive and within a week they would be armed, provided war clothing and food to sustain themselves as they crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia.
Once tavakumusha taizotambirwa nevanhu.
In July 1977, I crossed into Rhodesia through Feira, which was an area along the Zambia-Rhodesia border stretching from Chirundu to Kanyemba.
LM: When you crossed into Rhodesia, who were your leaders or which group were you in?
DM: Let me go back a bit. In 1977 it was difficult to cross into Rhodesia as a company or battalion because the war had intensified.
There was the risk of being discovered because companies or battalions were large groups.
However, that did not mean there were no companies and battalions.
When we came to the front, it was a section or platoon and we were told that we were under such a company and battalion.
Our company commander was Joseph Sibuko.
He was in charge of all the platoons and sections within that company.
The platoons and sections all along had a commander.
However, when we crossed into Rhodesia that is when a commissar was introduced in each platoon and section.
When I came in, I was the platoon commissar as well as commissar of the section that I had crossed under.
During that time, a platoon was made up of four sections and a section had about 12 fighters.
We did not know one another, but you knew there is a section operating in such an area.
We only met other sections when we wanted to plan a big attack and needed to group.
For the first time, patakapinda ndipo pakauya pfuti hombe dzaidhonzwa, the big machine guns and surface to air missiles.
Our platoon was based in Sipolilo, now Guruve.
Section yandaive operated in Kazangarare.
I operated in that section under the company that was commandeered by Cde Sibuku, who later became battalion commander.
When we arrived in Rhodesia, the government had introduced Keeps.
These were enclosures of villages. Villagers would only go out kunorima and before dark return to their villages which were under guard by the Rhodesian security agents.
Anyone found outside the Keep during restricted hours would be in trouble.
This was a strategy by the Rhodesians to curb or monitor new faces in an area.
Kazangarare also had a keep and I operated there between 1977 and 1979 when the cease fire was announced.
LM: You mention that you were part of the group that covered the Sipolilo area. A Rhodesian Viscount plane was shot down in that area by the freedom fighters around the same time you say you were in operation there. What do you know about this incident?
DM: The group that hit the Viscount was another platoon.
Like I said, when we came in takanga tave nepfuti dzakakura including anti-aircraft missiles and surface to air missiles.
The group that came in through Chirundu and operated in the Kariba area was responsible for bringing that plane down.
It was a huge achievement that boosted our morale as freedom fighters and obviously sent Ian Smith into panic mode.
This group was renowned for bringing down zvindege zvataiti zvima Slays, which were used for surveillance by the Rhodesians.
We got to know of these operations through internal radio broadcasts.
LM: During the time you were at the front, can you tell us of some of the battles you encountered?
DM: When we came into Rhodesia, our sections mainly carried out surveillance missions.
We studied how the Rhodesian Forces operated. We also did surveillance on the villagers.
We would gather information, for instance, that there is a group of Rhodesian forces that conducts certain operations and the times.
We would then alert the section with land mines to plant them on the route used by the Rhodesians.
So when their vehicles were blown up, we would have already left the area.
But there was an encounter which was so bad.
I do not know how we made a mistake.
We had taken various positions as two of our comrades cooked at night.
As Zipra, we did not allow any civilian to cook or bring us food like what was happening to our Zanla colleagues.
Normally, we had only two people cooking and that was done under cover to avoid naked fires because that would be a target.
On that night I only heard a gunshot and there was no return of fire.
Then there was a second one.
Normally, we would not immediately retaliate because the enemy would be trying to locate us if we fired.
In that incident, I cannot say it was members of the Rhodesian Forces that attacked us. They should have been mercenaries, because they took their time in everything they did.
The mistake that one of our comrades, who was helping with the cooking, made was to stand. He was shot and died on the spot. The other colleague managed to drag the body and hid.
It was around 9pm.
We then grouped and tasked three of our cadres to take the body away and four of us remained hiding near the scene.
At around midnight, there was movement as the soldiers that had attacked us moved to the place where they had shot our colleagues.
They must have discovered that the body had been dragged away. We remained in our positions to make sure all, if not most of them were at the scene.
This was three hours after the shooting and the Rhodesian soldiers never used to operate like that. Their tactic was to attack and continue attacking or bring in reinforcements.
But this group seemed calm.
Their mistake was to assume that after three hours we would have left the area and they could move in to where we were.
We then opened fire targeting them.
Taiti kana toridza, tinenge taronga zvakakwana to ensure no room for error. Taidambura mhandu comrade because we spent most of our time strategising before any attack.
As our strategy takaridzira masoja with our aim being that no one survives.
Takarova asi hatina kuenda kunoona kuti vangani vafa. Takabva tatiza.
Takazoziva kwapera mazuva matatu kuti takanga tauraya seven masoja.
Normally, after such incidents the Rhodesians would drive to the Keeps and that is where the bodies would have been taken. Villagers would then tell us.
I think that was my major encounter. I say so because in all other encounters we never lost a comrade.
Tairova tobuda or we would be attacked, but escape without fatalities.
Asi ipapo takarasikirwa nacomrade, ainzi Elias Shungu.
But that does not mean in other sections under our platoon there were no deaths. We lost comrades such as Magela, Makwakwa, Mbili and Sutho.
