Brig-Gen Murozvi: The hard worker

16 Apr, 2017 - 00:04 0 Views
Brig-Gen Murozvi: The hard worker

The Sunday Mail

Maj-Gen Douglas Nyikayaramba
I first met Brigadier-General James Murozvi during the liberation struggle. It was around 1976/77 when our group was heading to Tanzania for military training.

We went via Mozambique, and I trained at Tengwe Base 2 while he was at Chibawawa and Chimoio.  We were then brought together at Beira. We both survived the infamous hunger of that period which killed some of our peers. Such deaths became common and threatened to thwart our journey to Tanzania.

As we overcame the adversities and prepared to leave for Tanzania, Rhodesian forces got wind of our travel arrangements.

An aircraft bearing a Nigerian flag was going to pick us up and fly us to Tanzania.

So, the Rhodesians painted one of their aircraft white and green – the colours of the Nigerian flag – to entrap us. If it were not for Frelimo intelligence, they would have wiped us out mercilessly. We shelved the journey and proceeded when we were sure that the coast was clear.

All of us were screened thoroughly when we arrived at Mtwara Airport in Tanzania.

Tanzanian authorities knew a lot about us and about Mgagao where some of our superiors had been involved in skirmishes.

They, therefore, sent back those they suspected could ignite more trouble. Jimmo, as we called Brig-Gen Murozvi, made it to Mgagao where he trained in a group that went by the Swahili name Sanya Haraka, which is chimbi chimbi in Shona.

The title denoted the urgency with which the group was required to execute the armed struggle and liberate Zimbabwe from colonial rule. Titles/themes were common in shaping key messages or denoting phases of the war. When Cde R.G Mugabe assumed leadership of Zanu, he directed that every year have a working theme.

Among the themes were “Year of the People’s Power” and “Year of the People’s Storm”.

Jimmo was in charge of Sanya Haraka, but was later deployed to cadet officer training. Our leaders knew that independence was imminent and so created a nucleus of the Officers Call. He then went to Mozambique, covering Manica and Gaza provinces.

It took a while for us to work together again during the struggle, and we were to collaborate after independence when I became a Lieutenant-Colonel and director in General Vitalis Zvinavashe’s office.

In 1994, Jimmo was appointed Gen Zvinavashe’s personal staff officer. It was an important period as this was the first time that Zimbabwe had a single commandant.

Gen Zvinavashe was not easy to work with. He had come from intelligence and was thus particular about how he wanted things done.

He did not tolerate nonsense.

You needed to be very alert and diligent to work with him well. Gen Zvinavashe demanded only the best from his officers because he had taken over at a critical time when transformation was taking place.

An intelligence supremo, Gen Zvinavashe was alert to all potential dangers and instilled his sense of diligence in those who worked directly under him. So, the fact that he appointed Brig-Gen Murozvi as one of his key staffers is proof that Jimmo was a cut above the rest.

He was a professional, competent and knowledgeable. A lot was happening as he served under Gen Zvinavashe.

Three armies were being integrated; a new structure was being developed and concepts were emerging. Sadc also had a number of hot issues on its table such as South Africa’s independence.

Brig-Gen Murozvi was one of the officers who filtered former ANC veterans back into South Africa. More critically, in 1994, we managed the transformation of the Standing Committee of Defence Chiefs that we had during the struggle into a conventional structure for Sadc and the Organisation of Africa Unity.

We were creating a structure called the Defence Strategic Committee which still exists today. I was principal staff officer on that policy and worked very well with Brig-Gen Murozvi and Gen Zvinavashe.

Jimmo was an intellectual whom we would rely on for guidance. He was also an expert on research and adept at articulating issues.

In terms of intellect, he was among the best in that group.

We relied on him a lot; he was an asset.

He was unassuming, but so analytical and paid attention to detail. So, he managed this important transformation for us to get into Sadc. As we worked together in Gen Zvinavashe’s office, the OAU was discussing the meeting of all defence chiefs, and a question on creating a command of the OAU took centre stage.

Zimbabwe was well-prepared for the discussion. Our position was that it would have been self-defeating for us to assume the command while our continent was in its fragmented state.

Brig-Gen Murozvi was one of the officials responsible for crafting papers for such critical meetings. Our position was that we needed to create regional blocs first before creating a continental command structure as joining five blocs would be easier.

Our paper prevailed and became one of the discussion concepts. Our influence at that forum was immense, so much that we convinced the officials to hold the next session in Harare.

Brig-Gen Murozvi was among the brains behind all these high-level talks. It was during that second defence chiefs’ meeting in Harare that Zimbabwe also managed to convince the world on the Brahimi Report which was premised on the view that Africa should be self-sustaining and resolve internal conflicts under the auspices of the OAU.

The Brahimi Report takes its genesis from Zimbabwe, and Brig-Gen Murozvi was one of those who worked behind the scenes to develop the concept document. The biggest lesson that we learn from Brig-Gen Murozvi is that you cannot defend a country without intellectual capacity.

It is not just about gun-toting, toyi-toying alone.

No.

There is brainpower behind military might. You defend a country by understanding broader threats, schemes and the mental power behind it. This is why we talk about the Marxist approach to national security because threats can come from, for instance, the health, education or social sectors.

You must understand the implications of all this and take preventive measures. The Cairo Declaration of 1993 says we must take measures to prevent conflict because it is expensive to manage and can destroy a country. Brig-Gen Murozvi was a master at this; an intellectual par excellence in terms of national security. It’s a pity such an intellectual giant has gone. All we can do now is impart his values to others, ensuring his prowess is emulated.

I’m hurt; my heart is bleeding.

 Major-General Douglas Nyikayaramba is the Zimbabwe National Army’s Chief of Staff Administration. He shared these views with The Sunday Mail’s Chief Reporter Kuda Bwititi during Brig-Gen Murozvi’s burial at the National Heroes’ Acre on April 12, 2017.

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